> [C] YUGOSLAVIA: TWELVE FATAL MISTAKES BY INSIDE AND OUTSIDE PARTIES
> By Johan Galtung, dr hc mult, Professor of Peace Studies;
> Director, TRANSCEND: A Peace and Development Network
> > [1] The failure to take seriously the European macro-divides,
> Catholic-Orthodox and Christian-Muslim, playing with fire inside
> Croatia, Serbia and B-i-H, playing with fire in the near context
> and in the remote context; EU, Russia, Ottoman/Muslim countries,
> and the USA that ultimately came down on the side of the latter.
> To get an "anchor" in Eurasia? An oil corridor? A Muslim empire?
> > [2] The failure to take seriously Yugoslav divides: the Croat
> spring 1971, Serbian action 1987-89, minority autonomy demands in
> Krajina/Slavonia, B-i-H and Kosovo/a; the fascism of ustashe and
> chetnik para-military forces. Atrocities were predictable.
> > [3] The failure to take seriously outside party histories, like
> Austria and Germany wanting revenge for the First and Second
> world wars and their loss of empire, possibly also Italy.
> > [4] The one-sided demonization of the Serbs, as the center of
> Evil in Yugoslavia, oblivious of where the shooting started (in
> Slovenia) and the blatant ethnic discrimination (in Croatia).
> > [5] The one-sided demonization of Milosevic, as the center of
> the Center of Evil, oblivious of the hardline nationalists Seselj
> and Arkan, also failing to understand Milosevic' appeal as a
> reaction to Titoist anti-Serbian policies, and his efforts to
> protect (like Saddam Hussein) some kind of welfare state.
> > [6] The failure to take Perez de Cuellar's warnings to Genscher
> seriously: no undue haste in recognition, protect minorities, no
> one-sided policies, have a policy for Yugoslavia as a whole, take
> time; indeed, the failure to make his views public at all.
> > [7] The failure to call a general Conference on Security and
> Cooperation in Southeast Europe as an alternative to a Contact
> Group of six heavily involved big powers with their own agendas.
> > [8] The failure to grant the parties in Yugoslavia "equal rights
> to self-determination"; for Slovenes and Croats, but also for the
> Serbs in Krajina/Slavonia; for Bosniaks, but also for Serbs and
> Croats in B-i-H; for Serbs retaining their US and OSCE membership
> but also for Hungarians in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo/a;
> for Macedonians, but also for Albanians in Macedonia.
> > [9] The failure to think in terms of a Yugoslav confederation.
> With Montenegro as one entity equal self-determination leads to
> 12+ entities as opposed to 8 in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution,
> not a dramatic change and a very preferable alternative.
> > [10] The failure to take the religious dimension seriously; the
> conflict is not over theology, but religion serves to identify
> the parties across state borders and produces true believers.
> > [11] The failure to take the economic dimensions seriously; there
> debts to be collected and oil pipe lines to be built.
> > [12] The failure to take media manipulation seriously, like
> Hill&Knowlton, and Ruder Finn. No doubt there are others.
> >